




Department of Energy  
National Nuclear Security Administration  
Washington, DC 20585  
March 10, 2010

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS  
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR  
NONPROLIFERATION  
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR  
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

FROM: THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO  (for)  
CENTRAL TECHNICAL AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF  
WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS AND SUPPORTING WATER  
SUPPLIES

The attached memorandum from the Office of Health, Safety, and Security dated December 9, 2009, transmits interim guidance for the design and operation of new Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems and supporting water supplies used in safety significant and safety class applications for new nuclear projects. This interim guidance describes an acceptable approach for implementing the design and operational requirements specified in Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, for safety significant and safety class systems. This guidance was developed to meet commitments in DOE's Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2008-1, *Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems*.

As indicated in the attached memorandum, this interim guidance does not constitute a requirement, and individual sites have the flexibility to use other approaches. However, the goal of this effort is to preclude the need to develop design and operational criteria for new projects on a case basis, thereby saving costs and improving safety through the use of a consistent, defensible approach. The information in this interim guidance will be incorporated into a future revision of DOE Standard 1066, *Fire Protection Design*.

I am issuing this interim guidance for use by NNSA personnel and contractors for the design and operation of new Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems and supporting water supplies used in safety significant and safety class applications. The Deputy Administrators for Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and for Infrastructure and Environment should provide this guidance to their Federal Project Directors for use on NNSA projects. While this interim guidance is not a requirements document, applicable projects that have not yet completed Preliminary Design should evaluate their current



design plans against the enclosed general design criteria and formally document the results of this review, including any deviations from the criteria and the bases for deviation, in official project files. This guidance is not required to be evaluated for projects currently in the Final Design phase.

The Office of Project Management and Systems Support (NA-54) will review the implementation of this interim guidance as part of its ongoing project management oversight responsibilities during Technical Independent Project Reviews and Design Reviews. Please provide any concerns or comments that should be considered as this interim guidance is incorporated into DOE STD 1066 by memorandum to the Office of Safety (NA-171) and to the Chief, Defense Nuclear Safety (NA-2.1).

This guidance does not apply to operational Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, however, it may be a useful tool for evaluating potential upgrades in the safety classification of existing fire protection systems. Additionally, the specific operational requirements of this interim guidance may be useful in the development and periodic updates to Documented Safety Analyses for existing facilities.

If you have any questions or comments regarding these expectations, please contact Don Nichols (202-586-8216) or Kim Loll (301-903-6369) of my staff.

Attachment

cc: G. Podonsky, HS-1  
K. Boardman, NNSA Service Center

**DNFSB Recommendation 2008-1  
Core Team and Working Group Members**

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Ken Keith	

# U.S. Department of Energy

## **Interim Guidance on Design and Operational Criteria for Safety Class and Safety Significant Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems**

**Milestone 5.3.1 Deliverable**

**Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
Recommendation 2008-1**

*Safety Classification of  
Fire Protection Systems*



**Washington, DC 20585**

**November 2009**

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**INTERIM GUIDANCE ON DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL  
CRITERIA FOR  
SAFETY CLASS AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANT  
WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS**

**1. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this document is to provide interim guidance on design and operational criteria for new safety class and safety significant Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems. Its objective is to provide guidance in areas of system design and operation that are not currently well defined in existing Department of Energy (DOE) Directives or Standards so that these issues will not have to be addressed on a project-by-project basis for new projects.

This interim guide was developed by a working group that was led by the technical component of DOE's Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2008-1, Core Team. The Core Team and its primary contributing working group members are listed in Appendix A.

The interim guidance may be issued by the Program Offices for new nuclear facility projects until final guidance and criteria can be issued through the DOE Directives or Standards systems.

Note that this guidance describes suggested non-mandatory approaches for meeting requirements that are promulgated elsewhere. Guides are not requirements documents and are not construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual. Alternate approaches for meeting the requirements can be utilized.

**2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE**

This interim guide is intended for NEW Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility projects which intend to utilize a new Wet Pipe Sprinkler system as a safety class or safety significant system. This guidance may also be useful as a tool for evaluating upgrades in the safety classification of existing sprinkler systems; however, this is not intended to apply to existing safety system installations that are not being upgraded.

**3. DEFINITIONS**

**Safety Class Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs):** SSCs, including portions of process systems whose preventive or mitigative function, are necessary to limit radioactive hazardous material exposure to the public, as determined from safety analyses. [10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 830.3]

**Safety Significant SSCs:** SSCs that are not designated as safety class SSCs, but whose preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth and/or worker safety as determined from safety analyses. [10 CFR 830.3]

**Documented Safety Analysis (DSA):** A documented analysis of the extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers, the public, and the environment, including a description of the conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the basis for ensuring safety. [10 CFR 830.3]

#### 4. REQUIREMENTS

General design criteria for safety class and safety significant systems specified in Chapter I of DOE Order (O) 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, are applicable to Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems utilized in safety significant and safety class applications. The following excerpts of these criteria are provided to illustrate the flow down and relationship of the general criteria from DOE O 420.1B to new specific criteria and guidance for Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems provided in this interim guide. However, any additional documents referenced in governing contracts should also be used in conducting design activities. Nothing in this guide relieves DOE Elements and Contractors from their responsibility to ensure all DOE O 420.1B requirements, including those summarized below, are met.

##### DOE Order 420.1B

- Safety analyses must be used to establish the identity and functions of safety class and safety significant SSCs.
- Nuclear facility design objectives must include multiple layers of protection to prevent or mitigate the unintended release of radioactive materials to the environment, otherwise known as defense in depth. Defense in depth must include applying conservative design margins and quality assurance (QA).
- Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities must be designed to facilitate inspections, testing, maintenance, repair, and replacement of safety SSCs as part of a reliability, availability, and maintainability program with the objective that the facility is maintained in a safe state.
- Safety SSCs and safety software must be designed, commensurate with the importance of the safety functions performed, to perform their safety functions when called upon and to meet the quality assurance program requirements of either 10 CFR 830, Subpart A, *Quality Assurance*, or DOE O 414.1C, *Quality Assurance*, as applicable.
- Safety class electrical systems must be designed to preclude single point failure.

Additionally, Chapter II of DOE O 420.1B requires that fire protection for DOE facilities, sites, activities, design, and construction must meet or exceed applicable building codes

and codes and standards of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). As such, Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems must meet or exceed the applicable NFPA codes and standards, including NFPA 13 along with all other support system requirements necessary to maintain system operability. Note that DOE O 420.1B also mandates that facilities meet “Highly Protected Risk” criteria and references DOE-Standard (STD)-1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria* which includes supplemental design guidance for Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems.

DOE-STD-1189, *Integrating Safety into the Design Process*, which is required to be implemented in accordance with DOE O 413.3A, Change 1, *Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets*, outlines the process for ensuring safety is integrated early into the facility design process and for developing safety documentation to support safety design decisions. It also provides criteria for identifying safety class and safety significant systems and criteria for the seismic design of SSCs.

## **5. SPECIFIC DESIGN CRITERIA/GUIDANCE FOR WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEM**

This section discusses how the general design criteria from Chapter I of DOE O 420.1B apply to the design of sprinkler systems. It is formatted consistent with DOE Guide (G) 420.1-1, *Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for use with DOE O 420.1 Facility Safety*. Note that a summary of this guidance as utilized for (1) general use (e.g., non-nuclear); (2) safety significant applications; and (3) safety class applications, is provided in Appendix B.

### **5.1 Function of the Wet Pipe Sprinkler System**

The safety class and safety significant function of the Wet Pipe Sprinkler system is defined in the DSA of the facility (typically in Chapter 4 of the DSA) and should include information regarding the size and type of fires that the system is designed for along with any specific considerations that may be required for the system to perform its intended function. For example, automatic water-based fire suppression systems are generally intended to limit fire spread but not necessarily extinguish it (unless special hazards are considered). If the safety analysis determines that emergency responder actions to complete extinguishment are a part of the safety class or safety significant function, then this should be identified as it could impact the design by adding alarm/ notification components. It is a good practice to include this information in a system design document, such as a system design description developed in accordance with DOE-STD-3024-98, *Content of System Design Descriptions*. Additionally, conditions under which the sprinkler system must remain operable to prevent or mitigate analyzed events (e.g., seismic and loss of power events) should also be documented. The NFPA-related design requirements should also be identified in the System Design Description.

## 5.2 System Boundary

The boundary of the safety class or safety significant Wet Pipe Sprinkler system should be defined such that it is clear which components are to be classified within the system. A boundary for sprinklers is typically determined at the system control valve or at the underground lead-in post indicator valve (PIV).

All piping should either be designed for the maximum pressure and design basis accident (DBA) conditions, or the design must show that failure of the piping or component not credited to be safety class or safety significant will not negatively impact the credited portions of the system. For example, for failure of pressure gages the design can include water discharged from a broken gage in the required flow rate capacity, and the total water discharged in the required water supply.

## 5.3 Support Systems

Per DOE O 420.1B, supporting systems must be identified. The water supply system is the most important support system and is discussed in detail in the companion guide to this interim guide, *Interim Guidance on Design and Operational Criteria for Water Supply Systems Supporting Safety-Class and Safety-Significant Fire Suppression Systems*.

As stated in the general criteria of DOE G 420.1-1 the support systems must be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to standards and quality requirements commensurate with their importance to safety.

In some cases, safety SSCs rely upon support SSCs to perform their intended safety function. These support SSCs may be classified as safety class or safety significant SSCs. A safety class designation may be appropriate if the support system is necessary for the safety class SSC to operate (e.g., power) or the failure of the support system can lead to either failure or reduced availability of the safety class function. In general, in accordance with Section 5.1.2.1 of DOE G 420.1-1, the following classification criteria apply:

- Support SSCs to safety class SSCs must be classified as safety class if their failures can prevent a safety class SSC from performing its safety functions.
- Support SSCs to safety significant SSCs that mitigate or prevent accidents with the potential for significant onsite consequences should be classified as safety significant if their failures prevent a safety significant SSC from performing its safety functions.
- Support SSCs to safety significant SSCs that mitigate or prevent accidents with only the potential for significant localized consequences need not be classified as safety significant.

Examples of support systems (beyond the water supply system) may include the freeze protection system, alarm devices and associated trim, and pressure monitoring systems. As stated in the general criteria in DOE G 420.1-1, support systems must be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to standards and quality requirements commensurate with their importance to safety.

Details supporting implementation of DOE O 420.1B and DOE G 420.1-1 for the freeze protection system, alarm trim, and water pressure monitoring system gauges are provided below.

### **5.3.1 Freeze Protection Systems**

In most cases the freeze protection system should be classified at the same level as the safety sprinkler system. Examples of appropriate freeze protection systems may include heating the space, heat tracing, building insulation, anti-freeze and water circulation. An alternative option is to have the sprinkler system monitored by a low temperature alarm system that is classified at the same level as the safety sprinkler system in conjunction with the appropriate Technical Safety Requirement Limiting Condition for Operation. This requirement should ensure that compensatory actions are taken to warrant the operability of the sprinkler system upon loss of the freeze protection system during sub-freezing weather. The freeze protection system should be designed, fabricated erected, and tested to the standards consistent with that provided for the sprinkler system.

The freeze protection system does not need to be designed to preclude system failure given a single active component failure (even at the safety class level) if the facility owner can justify that there are adequate design features and/or controls to ensure that failure of the freeze protection would provide indication of its inoperability, and would not immediately impact operability of the sprinkler system. For instance, because of system failure alarms and compensatory measures, malfunctions are detected and corrected before the piping freezes. The operability of the freeze protection system should be included as a Limiting Condition for Operation in the Technical Safety Requirements.

### **5.3.2 Alarm Devices**

Water flow indicating devices and associated trim support the Wet Pipe Sprinkler System by indicating that the system has operated. A flow alarm is commonly achieved by a water pressure alarm switch that is pressurized when the alarm check valve is unseated long enough to register an alarm. In general, the alarm will alert locally as well as remotely to summon emergency responders. These devices do not normally perform a safety function in that this equipment is not required for the sprinkler system to perform its safety function (deliver water to the fire). The sprinkler system should be designed to be able to deliver water to the fire at the full volume and pressures required with failure of these devices in any orientation (fail open/closed, pipe rupture).

### 5.3.3 Water Pressure Monitoring System

A water pressure monitoring system (sensors and associated local and/or remote indicating system) may support a wet pipe sprinkler system by providing notification when system water pressure is below minimal allowable levels. This equipment should be classified the same level as the sprinkler system it supports and should be designed, fabricated erected, and tested to standard industrial practices supplemented by additional QA provisions consistent with that provided for the sprinkler system.

## 5.4 Reliability/Redundancy/Single Failure Resistance

Section 5.1.1.2 of DOE G 420.1-1 states that the facility and its systems must be designed to perform all safety functions with the reliability indicated in the DSA and that the single-point failure criterion, requirements, and design analysis identified in American National Standard Institute/Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers (ANSI/IEEE) 379 must be applied during the design process as the primary method of achieving this reliability. Since ANSI/IEEE-379 does not have criteria for mechanical systems or non-reactor facilities, the following additional criteria should be applied for safety class and safety significant systems to further improve the reliability of the sprinkler system.

### 5.4.1 Reliability/Redundancy/Single Failure Resistance Criteria for Safety Class Components

Safety class Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems should be designed to prevent a single point failure such that redundancy is provided for active components (those which must change state in the performance of their safety function). Active components in sprinkler systems include the sprinklers, and any valves that must open or close during the performance of its nuclear safety function. Note that valves which are normally locked in the open position and/or electronically monitored are considered passive components as they are not required to change state in order for the sprinkler system to perform its intended function. Furthermore, in accordance with American Nuclear Society (ANS)/ANSI 58.9-1981, *Single Failure Criteria for Light Water Reactor Safety-Related Fluid Systems*, an active failure of a simple swing check valve does not have to be considered in the design because of their high reliability. Refer to ANS/ANSI 58.9-1981, Section 4 for details.

The system should be designed so that the failure of a single sprinkler would not result in the loss of safety function and that the failure of an active component in the flow path would not result in the loss of safety function. In a room with a single sprinkler, the addition of a second sprinkler may be necessary if the control of fire in that area is needed per the facility DSA. In rooms with multiple sprinkler heads, the impact of the loss of a single sprinkler head should be evaluated to ensure that it will not result in the loss of the sprinkler system from performing its safety class function.

Note: For maintainability (and availability) considerations, it may be appropriate to include some additional redundancy (e.g., so one component/train may be taken out of service for maintenance) for passive and active components.

#### **5.4.2 Reliability/Redundancy/Single Failure Resistance Criteria for Safety Significant Components**

Chapter II of DOE O 420.1B provides requirements for all fire protection systems at DOE facilities. Furthermore, it invokes NFPA standards as augmented by criteria in DOE-STD-1066, and fire protection criteria for Highly Protected Risks (e.g., as specified in FM Global data sheets<sup>1</sup>) and the conservative design criteria in Section 5.5. Safety significant components meeting these requirements are adequate to ensure the appropriate level of reliability. No additional consideration of redundancy or single failure resistance is necessary.

### **5.5 Conservative Design Margins**

The following features should be applied to provide conservative design margins for new wet pipe fire sprinkler systems classified as safety class or safety significant. These items are additional items above the NFPA and DOE-STD-1066 requirements to enhance the reliability and availability of this type of fire protection system.

- Systems should have strainers to protect against debris if the water supply is prone to sediment or debris.
- All piping should be a minimum of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Schedule 40<sup>2</sup> steel for pipes 6 inches in diameter and smaller. For pipes above 6 inches in diameter Schedule 30 steel piping (minimum) should be used.
- Protected areas should be designed to no less than Ordinary Hazard (Group 1) requirements (per NFPA 13) and should not exceed 130 square feet per sprinkler. For Ordinary Hazard (Group 2) and Extra Hazard occupancies, sprinkler coverage should not exceed 100 square feet per sprinkler.
- For Seismic Design Category 3 and above, a structural engineer should evaluate hanger and earthquake sway bracing configurations and locations where hangers and bracing are attached to the building if the sprinkler system is credited for a post seismic event per Chapter 3 of the DSA (Hazard and Accident Analysis).
- System should be designed to continuously monitor water system supply pressure to insure it does not drop below the system design required pressure. An example of continuous monitoring includes the fire pump monitoring systems.

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<sup>1</sup> FM Global (formally Factory Mutual) data sheets provide additional (beyond NFPA) fire protection design and operational criteria up.

<sup>2</sup> The ATSM schedule defines required pipe thickness.

- Spare parts for critical components should be maintained for use by maintenance personnel.
- The following components (which are allowed per NFPA) should not be utilized for safety significant and safety class applications because experience has shown these components to be prone to failure:<sup>3</sup>
  - Vane or paddle type of alarm devices;
  - On/off sprinklers;
  - Mechanical slip fittings; and
  - Cast Iron fittings (Fittings should be a minimum of malleable Iron per American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B16.3, *Malleable Iron Threaded Fittings*, where additional fitting strength is required.).
- The system static and residual pressures should meet the minimum design basis requirements plus the DOE-STD-1066 prescribed margin of 10 percent below the supply curve, but not less than 10 pounds per square inch.
- The system shall be designed by a professional engineer or a NICET Level III (or IV) technician using seismic criteria specified by the design authority.

## 5.6 Environmental Conditions

The environmental conditions under which the sprinkler must perform its function should be defined as part of the facility design process in accordance with DOE-STD-1189 and should be documented in the safety design documents (i.e., the Conceptual Safety Design Report, Preliminary Safety Design Report, and Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis, and finally the Documented Safety Analysis [DSA]) and facility fire hazards analysis. Since sprinklers are part of a facility, the facility design will address most of these issues. Documentation of environmental conditions should address the following items:

- Seismic;
- Other natural phenomena hazards (NPH) such as tornado, high winds, flooding and lightning, temperature (e.g., below freezing), and humidity;
- Facility hazards, such as internal flooding, explosions, fire, missile impacts, vehicle impacts, corrosive environments;
- Wildland fires; and
- Physical damage from adjacent equipment and systems (e.g., during a seismic event);

---

<sup>3</sup> If the user chooses to utilize these devices, then their potential impact should be evaluated including those discussed in section 5.8.

Additionally, water supply quality conditions (for example, chemical and microbiological induced corrosion) should be addressed. The system design should permit inspections and tests to detect potential water quality issues. For example, the design may include the installation of flushing connections, interior test plugs, inspection tees, sacrificial sprinklers (i.e., sprinklers that will be removed for inspection and testing), etc., to facilitate interior piping inspections and metallurgical system tests deemed necessary to validate any present (or future) water quality concerns.

Examples of design criteria that may be appropriate to address how environmental conditions can impact design include the following:

- Piping should be either galvanized or protected against external corrosion where exposed to adverse conditions; and
- Hanger or seismic bracing should either be galvanized or protected against corrosion where exposed to adverse conditions.

## **5.7 Seismic Design**

DOE-STD-1189 Appendix A should be applied in determining the seismic classification of the system if the sprinkler system is credited for a post-seismic event per Chapter 3 of the DSA (which describes the Hazard and Accident Analysis). Supporting systems, e.g., the water supply system should also follow DOE-STD-1189 as identified in the DSA.

Per DOE-STD-1189, the design loads as determined from ANSI American Nuclear Society (ANS) 2.26-2004, *Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems and Components for Seismic Design* and American Society of Civil Engineers/Structural Engineer Institute (ASCE/SEI) 43-05, *Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities* should be used to design the system, associated hangers and supports, and earthquake sway bracing. NFPA 13 adequately addresses design for seismic design category (SDC) 1 and 2. For SDC 3 and above, a structural engineer should evaluate the hanger and earthquake sway bracing configurations and attachments of these components to the similarly designed building structure. A qualified structural engineer utilizing the loads provided by the site seismic design authority should be used in conjunction with NFPA 13 to determine the hanger and earthquake sway bracing locations.

## **5.8 Interface Evaluation**

Interfacing systems should be evaluated to ensure they do not impact the reliability, availability, or functionality of the system. For example, failure of the mechanical components associated with a flow switch should be evaluated to insure that a single failure of the active component will not disable the system and that failure of a passive component during DBAs is not credible. In addition, the impact of non-seismically qualified equipment on any seismically qualified sprinkler system should be evaluated. For example, the water supply for a non-safety class plenum spray system might be

provided from the safety class sprinkler system for convenience. To be acceptable the water spray systems piping would have to meet the same seismic requirements as the sprinkler system, or it would have to be proven that a failure of the spray system's piping would not negatively impact the safety class portions of the system. This would be required even though the spray system was not credited to function during or following the DBA.

Connected portions of the system whose preventive or mitigative function is determined from safety analysis not to be necessary to limit radioactive or hazardous material exposure to the public can be omitted from safety class criteria only to the extent it can be established that credible failures do not exist that would compromise the safety class function of the system.

## 5.9 Quality Assurance

The QA requirements of 10 CFR 830 and DOE O 414.1C must be applied in the design, manufacture, and installation of fire protection systems. The site QA and/or project program can be utilized if it meets all of these requirements.

It is recognized that NFPA documents are principally developed to define design, hardware selection, and installation adequacy to perform fire protection functions. DOE requires that management controls be developed and applied in performing the various functions for assuring a quality fire protection system. QA plans are typically in place and have been approved for the site and/or project. Specific guidance for controlling quality-related activities that apply to the fire protection system installations may be beneficial to assure a quality installation that complies with the applicable safety classification level.

To support appropriate implementation of the site or project QA program relative to fire protection systems, the following topics should also be addressed (beyond what is specifically identified in DOE O 420.1B and referenced NFPA codes and standards):

- Document control (documents are stored properly to avoid damage, responsibility for completeness, maintenance and distribution are identified, etc.).
- Records of qualification of fire protection staff and control of qualification records.
- Procurement documentation and control of purchased items or services.
- Identification and control of components (e.g., sprinkler heads) per requirement 8 of NQA-1-2008, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*.
- Handling, shipping and storage requirements for components.

- Control of nonconforming items to prevent inadvertent installation or use.
- Commercial grade dedication of components based upon third party testing and production monitoring.

QA programs should be audited in different phases (design, construction, start-up/acceptance testing, and operations) using DOE O 413.3 A.

Figure 1 illustrates the flow down of QA requirements to fire protection programs.

## **6. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL (SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION) REQUIREMENTS**

### **6.1 Technical Safety Requirements -- Limiting Condition for Operation**


The following is an example “operability statement” and additional guidance that can be used in developing a Technical Safety Requirement Limiting Condition for Operation for both safety significant and safety class Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems:

“In order for a sprinkler system to be OPERABLE, the system must be supplied with an adequate water supply, with sufficient pressure and flow capability; distribution branches and sprinkler heads must be unobstructed so that the system is capable of controlling a fire as credited in the fire hazard analysis and DSA, and all sprinkler system Technical Safety Requirement surveillance requirements must be current.”

It should be noted that a sprinkler system may be fully functional for property and life safety purposes but may be considered inoperable for nuclear safety purposes if a Limiting Condition for Operation for the nuclear process is not met.

### **6.2 TSR Surveillance and Testing Requirements**

For safety class and safety significant sprinkler systems, the requirements in NFPA 25, *Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems*, should be used to establish Technical Safety Requirement surveillance requirements. In addition, personnel performing the inspection, testing, and maintenance should be appropriately qualified through activities such as the National Institute for Certification in Engineering Technologies and/or Authority Having Jurisdiction or Fire Marshal approved vendor equipment training programs.



**APPENDIX A**  
**Core Team and Primary Contributing Working Group Members**

**DNFSB Core Team (Technical Members)**

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**APPENDIX B**  
**Summary of Additional Wet Pipe Sprinkler Criteria and Guidance  
for Safety Class and Safety Significant Applications**

DOE has established very stringent design requirements for fire protection systems utilized at all facilities (nuclear and non-nuclear). For fire protection systems utilized in safety significant and safety class applications in DOE nuclear facilities, additional requirements and criteria may need to be implemented to ensure very high levels of reliability with increased design margins and quality assurance.

The following provides a summary of the requirements, criteria and guidance for three levels of protections provided, i.e., general use (e.g., non-nuclear), safety significant, and safety class:

**General Use**

Local Building Codes

Facility Safety Order (DOE O 420.1B)

DOE-STD-1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria*

Additional Highly Protected Risk Criteria; e.g., as defined in FM Global (formerly Factory Mutual) Data Sheets

**Safety Significant (Design)**

In addition to the criteria for general use, the following additional design requirements/guidance is applicable for Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems used in safety significant applications:

- A. The following sprinkler components should not be used<sup>4</sup>:
- Vane or paddle type alarm devices;
  - On/off sprinklers;
  - Mechanical slip fittings; and
  - Cast Iron fittings (Fittings should be a minimum of Malleable Iron per ASME B16.3 where additional fitting strength is required).
- B. Strainers should be used for all systems connected to water supplies prone to sediment or debris.
- C. Sprinkler piping should be a minimum of Schedule 40 steel for pipes 6 inches or less in diameter and Schedule 30 steel for pipe greater than 6 inches in diameter.

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<sup>4</sup> If the user chooses to utilize these devices, then their potential impact should be evaluated separately.

- D. Areas should be designed to no less than Ordinary Group 1 requirements (per NFPA 13) and should not exceed 130 square feet per sprinkler. For Ordinary Group 2 and Extra Hazard occupancies, sprinkler coverage should not exceed 100 square feet per sprinkler.
- E. For SDC 3 and higher, a qualified structural engineer should evaluate locations where hangers and earthquake sway bracing utilizing the loads provided by the site seismic design authority in conjunction with NFPA 13 criteria.
- F. Environmental conditions should be defined and documented for sprinkler systems and the system should be designed to remain operable for those events they are relied on as specified in the DSA. Examples include:
- Seismic;
  - Other natural phenomena hazards (NPH) such as high wind potential, tornados, flooding, lightning, low temperature and humidity;
  - Facility hazards, such as internal flooding, explosions, fire outside the system boundary, missile and vehicle impacts, corrosive environments;
  - Wildland fire;
  - Physical damage from adjacent equipment and systems (for example – during a seismic event); and
  - Water quality.
- G. Wet Pipe Sprinkler support systems, such as freeze protection, must be classified as equal or superior to the classified Wet Pipe Sprinkler system or equipped with support system alarming devices connected to an alarming system that is classified as equal or superior to the classified Wet Pipe Sprinkler system.
- H. To support appropriate implementation of the site or project QA program relative to fire protection systems, the following topics should be addressed (beyond what is specifically identified in DOE O 420.1B and referenced NFPA codes and standards):
- Document control (documents are stored properly to avoid damage, responsibility for completeness, maintenance and distribution are identified, etc.).
  - Records of qualification of fire protection staff and control of qualification records.
  - Procurement documentation and control of purchased items or services.

- Identification and control of components (e.g., sprinkler heads) per requirement 8 of NQA-1-2008, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*.
  - Handling, shipping and storage requirements for components.
  - Control of nonconforming items to prevent inadvertent installation or use.
  - Commercial grade dedication of components based upon third party testing and production monitoring.
- I. The QA Program should be audited in different phases (design, construction, and operations) using DOE O 413.3A.

**Safety Class (Design)**

In addition to the criteria for general use and safety significant applications, the following additional design requirements/guidance is applicable for Wet Pipe Sprinkler systems used in safety class applications:

- A. Active features of a sprinkler system must be designed to preclude a single point failure for safety class sprinkler systems if the component failure results in the system's inability to perform its safety function. Active features of a sprinkler system include the sprinklers themselves plus any other installed component that would exhibit a change in state.
- B. There should be a minimum of two sprinklers in each area being protected.

**Safety Significant (Operability)**

Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limiting Conditions for Operation should be defined (including appropriate action statements to address situations when the system is inoperable). TSR Surveillance Requirements should be defined consistent with NFPA 25 Inspection Testing and Maintenance requirements.

**Safety Class (Operability)**

Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limiting Conditions for Operation should be defined (including appropriate action statements to address situations when the system is inoperable). TSR Surveillance Requirements should be defined consistent with NFPA 25 Inspection Testing and Maintenance requirements.

# U.S. Department of Energy

## **Interim Guidance on Design and Operational Criteria for Water Supply Systems Supporting Safety Class and Safety Significant Fire Suppression Systems**

**Milestone 5.3.1 Deliverable**

**Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
Recommendation 2008-1**

*Safety Classification of  
Fire Protection Systems*



**Washington, DC 20585**

**November 2009**

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# **INTERIM GUIDANCE ON DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA FOR WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS SUPPORTING SAFETY CLASS AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANT FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS**

## **1. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this document is to provide interim guidance on design and operational criteria for water supply systems that support safety class and safety significant water based fire suppression systems. Its objective is to provide guidance in areas of system design and operation that are not currently well defined in existing Department of Energy (DOE) Directives or Standards so that these issues will not have to be addressed on a project-by-project basis for new projects.

This interim guide was developed by a working group that was led by the technical component of DOE's Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2008-1, Core Team. The Core Team and primary contributing working group members are listed in Appendix A.

The interim guidance may be issued by the Program Offices for new nuclear facility projects until final guidance and criteria can be issued through the DOE Directives or Standards systems.

Note that this guidance describes suggested non-mandatory approaches for meeting requirements that are promulgated elsewhere. Guides are not requirements documents and are not construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual.

## **2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE**

This interim guide is intended for NEW Hazard Category 1, 2, 3 nuclear facility projects which intend to utilize a water supply system as a safety class or safety significant system. Because many new DOE facilities take advantage of existing infrastructure systems, this guidance may provide useful information for the use of these systems in safety significant or safety class applications.

For the purposes of this guide, a water supply system may include the water source/treatment, storage and pumping capabilities, and the piping network arranged to deliver water to the selected safety system.

## **3. DEFINITIONS**

***Safety Class Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs):*** SSCs, including portions of process systems, whose preventive or mitigative function are necessary to limit

radioactive hazardous material exposure to the public, as determined from safety analyses. [10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 830.3]

**Safety Significant (SS) SSCs:** SSCs which are not designated as safety class SSCs but whose preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth and/or worker safety as determined from safety analyses. [10 CFR 830.3]

**Documented Safety Analysis (DSA):** A documented analysis of the extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers, the public, and the environment, including a description of the conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the basis for ensuring safety. [10 CFR 830.3]

#### 4. REQUIREMENTS

General design criteria for safety class and safety significant systems specified in DOE Order (O) 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, are applicable to water supply systems that support safety class and safety significant fire suppression systems. The following excerpts of these criteria are provided here to illustrate the flow down and relationship of the general criteria from DOE O 420.1B to new specific criteria and guidance for water supply that is provided in this interim guide. However, any additional documents referenced in governing contracts should also be used in conducting design activities. Nothing in this guide relieves DOE Elements and Contractors from their responsibility to ensure all DOE O 420.1B requirements, including those summarized below, are met.

##### DOE Order 420.1B

- Safety analyses must be used to establish the identity and functions of safety class and safety significant SSCs.
- Nuclear facility design objectives must include multiple layers of protection to prevent or mitigate the unintended release of radioactive materials to the environment, otherwise known as defense in depth. Defense in depth must include applying conservative design margins and quality assurance (QA).
- Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities must be designed to facilitate inspections, testing, maintenance, repair, and replacement of safety SSCs as part of a reliability, availability, and maintainability program with the objective that the facility is maintained in a safe state.
- Safety SSCs and safety software must be designed, commensurate with the importance of the safety functions performed, to perform their safety functions when called upon and to meet the quality assurance program requirements of either 10 CFR 830, Subpart A, *Quality Assurance*, or DOE O 414.1C, *Quality Assurance*, as applicable.
- Safety class electrical systems must be designed to preclude single point failure.

Additionally, Chapter II of DOE O 420.1B requires that fire protection for DOE facilities, sites, activities, design, and construction must meet or exceed applicable building codes and codes and standards of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). As such, site water supplies for general fire protection must meet or exceed NFPA codes and standards, such as NFPA 20, 22, 24 and 801 with all other support system requirements necessary to maintain system operability. Note that DOE O 420.1B also mandates that facilities meet “Highly Protected Risk” criteria and references DOE-Standard (STD)-1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria*, which includes supplemental design guidance for water supplies.

DOE-STD-1189, *Integrating Safety into the Design Process*, which is required to be implemented in accordance with DOE O 413.3A, Change 1, *Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets*, outlines the process for ensuring safety is integrated early into the facility design process and developing safety documentation to support safety design decisions, and provides criteria for identifying safety class and safety significant systems and criteria for the seismic design of SSCs.

## **5. SPECIFIC DESIGN CRITERIA/GUIDANCE FOR WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS**

This section discusses how the general design criteria from Chapter I of DOE O 420.1B apply to the design of water supply systems. It is formatted consistent with DOE Guide (G) 420.1-1, *Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for use with DOE O 420.1 Facility Safety*.

There are several different basic arrangements for water supply that are typically used at DOE facilities. These include:

- Multipurpose (domestic/industrial/fire) water supply system outside of DOE control (e.g., a municipal water system);
- Multipurpose (domestic/industrial/fire) water supply system under DOE control;
- Dedicated (site/area wide) firewater supply system;
- Dedicated (building specific) firewater supply system; and
- Limited supply suppression systems specific to a protected hazard.

Appendix B describes these in more detail and provides schematics that can be useful in illustrating some of the design concepts discussed below. Note also that a summary of this guidance as utilized for (1) general use (e.g., non-nuclear), (2) safety significant applications, and (3) safety class applications is provided in Appendix C.

The type of water supply system should be justified based upon site- and facility-specific conditions as supported by the facility DSA, fire hazards analysis, water supply reliability analysis, and is subject to DOE review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 830 requirements for approval of the safety basis for the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities.

## **5.1 Function of the Water Supply System**

The safety function of the water supply system must be defined in the DSA of the facility (typically in Chapter 4 of the DSA) and should include information regarding the required design flow, pressures, and duration to meet the safety class or safety significant performance requirements. Also, conditions under which the water supply system must remain operable (e.g., seismic and loss of power events) should also be specified. It is a good practice to include this information in a system design document such as a system design description developed in accordance with DOE-STD-3024-98, *Content of System Design Descriptions*.

## **5.2 System Boundary**

The boundary of the safety class and safety significant water supply system should be defined such that it is clear which components are safety class, safety significant, and general industry use. The boundary of the safety class and safety significant water supply may start at the water source and include all components necessary to deliver water up to either a system control valve or the underground lead in Post Indicator Valve (PIV).

Boundaries between safety and non-safety systems water supply components should be identified, including identification of the means of isolation between the two. System boundaries should be described in the applicable system design description document. Piping and instrumentation drawings (P&ID) should be developed for each system that clearly delineates system interfaces and points of isolation.

## **5.3 Support Systems**

As stated in the general criteria of DOE G 420.1-1 the support systems must be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to standards and quality requirements commensurate with their importance to safety.

In some cases, safety SSCs rely upon support SSCs to perform their intended safety function. These support SSCs may be classified as safety class or safety significant SSCs. A safety class designation may be appropriate if the support system is necessary for the safety class SSC to operate (e.g., power) or the failure of the support system can lead to either failure or reduced availability of the safety class function. In general, in accordance with Section 5.1.2.1 of DOE G 420.1-1, the following classification criteria apply:

- Support systems to safety class systems must be classified as safety class if their failures can prevent a safety class system from performing its safety functions.
- Support systems to safety significant systems that mitigate or prevent accidents with the potential for significant onsite consequences should be classified as

safety significant if their failures prevent a safety significant system from performing its safety functions.

- Support systems to safety significant systems that mitigate or prevent accidents with the potential for significant localized consequences need not be classified as safety significant.

Examples of support systems may be municipal water supplies, water storage systems, water treatment systems, and electric power systems that supply power to water pumps. Details supporting implementation of DOE O 420.1B and DOE G 420.1-1 for a public water supply, water storage system, water treatment system, and electric power system are provided below.

### **5.3.1 Public Water Supplies**

If an adequate municipal water supply is available, it is generally the least costly and may be the most reliable source for safety significant or safety class systems. Municipal water systems in urban communities are usually operated by a staff of experienced professionals with a culture of providing continuous availability of water. Many systems have multiple sources, pumps and tanks as well as valved and gridded piping so that alternate pathways are available in case of damage. Breaks are normally restored within hours. However, since DOE has little control over the design and operation of these systems, an analysis should be made to ensure the municipal water system will perform reliably in accordance with the DSA functional and reliability requirements and DOE O 420.1B in a manner that is equivalent to or exceeds that provided by stand alone systems controlled by DOE.

Note that general purpose systems for life safety, property protection, and program interruption typically rely on the fire department or utility personnel to establish an alternative supply if the primary supply is not available. If a safety significant or safety class system requires more immediate correction, a facility or hazard-specific water storage system may be necessary. Such a system can be designed to meet only the safety significant or safety class nuclear safety needs for its capacity and will not necessarily have to be designed to meet the capacity requirements of other requirements such as the Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1), the Standard for Nuclear Facilities (NFPA 801), the Building Code, or the Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems (NFPA 13). For example, if the nuclear safety objective can be met with a 500-gallon pressure tank within the facility, then the NFPA criteria that may dictate larger water supply tanks for facility fire safety do not need to apply to the design of the portion of the system which is only serving the safety significant or safety class function.

### **5.3.2 Water Treatment Systems**

Water treatment systems are seldom within the safety significant or safety class boundary since the treated water in storage normally meets safety significant or safety class water capacity needs. However, treatment system may be required to meet safety significant or

safety class criteria if water storage capacity is inadequate and the raw water source is not suitable for fire protection purposes.

### **5.3.3 Electric Power to Pumps**

The electric power to fire pumps that are necessary to support the safety function will need to be classified at the same functional classification level (general duty, safety significant, or safety class) as the system they are supporting. For general duty and safety significant fire pumps, where there is not a diesel back-up, the electric power to the fire pumps should be fed from two separate utility connections or from a generator and a utility connection. The more usual arrangement is to install a diesel driver and pump which serves to back up an electric pump with a single source of power.

For safety class applications, in addition to the above, per DOE O 420.1B, the power electrical systems must be designed to preclude single point failure

## **5.4 Reliability/Redundancy/Single Failure Resistance**

Section 5.1.1.2 of DOE G 420.1-1 states that a facility and its systems must be designed to perform all safety functions with the reliability indicated in the DSA and that the single-point failure criterion, requirements, and design analysis identified in American National Standard Institute/Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers (ANSI/IEEE 379) must be applied during the design process as the primary method of achieving this reliability. Since ANSI/IEEE 379 does not have criteria for mechanical systems or non-reactor facilities, the following criteria should be applied for safety class systems to further improve the reliability of the water supply system.

### **5.4.1 Safety Class Criteria**

Safety class water supply systems should be designed such that redundancy is provided for active components (those which must change state to perform their function). Specifically, the system should be designed, such that the failure of any one single active system component, such as a pump or driver, cannot prevent the system from performing its intended safety function.

Components not required for the safety class function should not be classified as safety class. An example would be a jockey pump in a fire pump/jockey pump arrangement that only maintains system pressure up to the fire pump start point. In this case, the redundant fire pump may be used for safety class applications but the redundant jockey pumps would not be needed.

### **5.4.2 Safety Significant Criteria**

Water supply systems designed to meet NFPA 20, NFPA 22, and/or NFPA 24 (as applicable) are generally appropriate for safety significant applications. These systems should be designed using Highly Protected Risk criteria and additional criteria in DOE-STD-1066.

Any of the five types of water supply systems identified in Section 5 can potentially be utilized for safety significant applications. This is discussed further in Appendix B.

## **5.5 Conservative Design Margins**

The following features should be applied to provide conservative design margins for new water supply systems supporting safety class fire protection systems. These items are additional items above the NFPA and DOE-STD-1066 requirements to enhance the reliability and availability of safety class fire protection systems.

- Underground piping should be limited to cement-lined ductile iron (Class 52 minimum), polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping (Dimension Ratio [DR]14), and high density polyethylene piping (DR9). Additional limitations of material type may be needed for seismic design.
- Where restraints are required and are not bounded by the restraining methods for the type of pipe selected, two separate means of joint restraint should be used (e.g., thrust blocks and mechanical retaining glands, rodding).
- Ferrous piping should be provided with corrosion protection in accordance with American Water Works Association (AWWA) standards, such as polyethylene wrap or cathodic protection.
- A stable pipe bed should be provided, such as backfilling around piping of 18 inches with sand bedding. Seismic design may dictate alternate arrangements.
- Sectional (except for hydrant connection valves) and sprinkler/standpipe control valves should be limited to factory assembled listed/approved post indicator valve assemblies (PIVAs).
- In-ground pipe identification systems should be provided (ribbon, trace wire, red mud etc.).
- Water pressure at strategic points should be monitored at a constantly attended location for catastrophic failure.
- Acceptance testing should include full suppression system demand flow at the base of the riser, using a temporary header if necessary.

## **5.6 Environmental Conditions**

The environmental conditions under which the water supply must perform its function should be defined as part of the safety design process outlined in DOE-STD-1189 and should include:

- Natural hazards such as seismic events, tornado, high winds, flooding and lightning, temperature (e.g., below freezing), and humidity;
- Facility hazards, such as internal flooding, explosions, fire, missile impacts, vehicle impacts, and corrosive environments; and
- Wildland fire.

Additionally, water supply quality conditions (for example, chemical and microbiological induced corrosion) should be addressed. Therefore, system design should permit inspections and tests to detect potential water quality issues. For example, flushing connections, interior test plugs, inspection tees, etc., to facilitate interior piping inspections should be installed and metallurgical system tests deemed necessary to validate any present (or future) water quality concerns should be conducted.

An example of design criteria that may be appropriate to address how environmental conditions can impact design is that all exposed piping, such as an exterior backflow prevention device installed in areas which are not subject to freezing, could be either galvanized or protected against external corrosion where exposed to adverse conditions.

## **5.7 Seismic Design**

DOE-STD-1189 Appendix A should be applied in determining the seismic classification of the system for new facilities.

The design criteria established for above ground fire suppression should be applied to all above ground water supply components (see DOE-STD-1066). Below ground piping systems should not be utilized as the safety significant or safety class water supply to support systems if they cannot function at the seismic design category of the system they are supporting.

## **5.8 Interface Evaluation**

Interfacing systems should be evaluated to ensure they do not impact the availability, reliability or functionality of the system. Connected portions of the interfacing system to water supply system of a safety significant or safety class fire protection system, such as an outdoor hydrant loop, do not need to be classified as safety class and/or safety significant if it can be established that credible failures do not exist that would compromise the safety class function of the system. For example, while the functionality of a fire hydrant may not be required to be safety related, the hydrant pressure boundary may still be safety related if its failure could adversely affect the operability of the water supply system during an event.

## 5.9 Quality Assurance

The quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR 830 and DOE O 414.1C must be applied in the design, manufacture, and installation of new water supplies supporting safety class or safety significant fire protection systems. The site and/or project QA program can be utilized if it meets all of these requirements.

It is recognized that NFPA documents are principally developed to define design, hardware selection, and installation adequacy to perform fire protection functions. DOE requires that management controls be developed and applied in performing the various functions for assuring a quality system. QA plans are typically in place and have been approved for the site and/or project. Specific guidance for controlling quality-related activities that apply to system installations may be beneficial to assure a quality installation that complies with the applicable safety classification level.

To support appropriate implementation of the site or project QA program relative to fire protection systems, the following topics should be addressed (beyond what is specifically identified in DOE O 420.1B and referenced NFPA codes and standards) in the QA plan:

- Document control (documents are stored properly to avoid damage, responsibility for completeness, maintenance and distribution are identified, etc.).
- Records of qualification of fire protection staff and control of qualification records.
- Procurement documentation and control of purchased items or services.
- Identification and control of components (e.g., sprinkler heads) per requirement 8 of NQA-1-2008, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*.
- Handling, shipping and storage requirements for components.
- Control of nonconforming items to prevent inadvertent installation or use.
- Commercial grade dedication of components based upon third party testing and production monitoring.

The QA program should be audited in different phases (design, construction, and operations) using the process established in DOE O 413.3A.

When municipal water supplies are utilized, it may not be possible to qualify individual components (e.g., underground pipes), however, there is typically a significant amount of data for the system that indicates that the essentially passive system will reliably function during the duration of the accidents for which it is called upon and will have a very high

availability. This information can be utilized in performing a commercial-grade, dedication-like process where the critical function is defined as the availability of the system and the reliability to function on demand.

## **6. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL (SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION) REQUIREMENTS**

### **6.1 Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) -- Limiting Condition for Operation**

The following is an example “operability statement” that can be used in developing a Technical Safety Requirement Limiting Condition for Operation for both safety significant and safety class water supply systems:

“A water supply system is operational when it is capable of supplying adequate water (flow, pressure, and duration) from the storage tank to the facility fire suppression system and all TSR required surveillances are current.”

### **6.1 TSR Surveillance and Testing Requirements**

For water supply systems, the requirements in NFPA 25, *Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems*, apply. NFPA 20, 22, and 24 refer to NFPA 25 for inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies. In addition to these requirements, TSR surveillances should also include:

- An NFPA 25-allowed method to confirm that sufficient water control valves upstream of the system (e.g., wet pipe sprinkler system) control valve or PIV are fully open (i.e., locking, tagging or monitoring);
- A means to ensure the interior of underground piping remains free of obstructions and available to provide a clear path from the supply to the sprinkler riser. (One method might be post maintenance flow testing after disturbing any portion of the underground or any underground valve manipulation); and
- A means to identify any unaccounted water supply system leakage, such as a jockey pump.

In addition, water supply quality conditions (for example, chemical, and microbiological induced corrosion) should also be addressed through appropriate inspection testing and maintenance activities. Such activities should include regular metallurgical system tests (at a frequency deemed necessary to ensure no unacceptable system degradation).

## APPENDIX A

### Core Team and Primary Contributing Working Group Members

#### DNFSB Core Team (Technical Members)

James Bisker  
William Boyce (retired 2008)  
Matthew Cole  
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Sharon Steele

#### Primary Contributing Working Group Members


Duli Agarwal	Ken Keith
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## APPENDIX B

### Typical Water Supply Arrangements

#### Water Supply Arrangement No. 1: Multipurpose (domestic/industrial/fire) water supply system tied to a municipal water provider outside of DOE control.


In this detail, water is obtained from a qualified municipal water purveyor.



This arrangement should not be utilized for safety class applications but is used for general purpose fire protection and may be used for safety significant applications if requirements for reliability and quality assurance are met. The reason that the system should not be used in safety class applications is that, even though the system is essentially passive, the lack of DOE control over the supply, makes it prudent to have additional (e.g., backup) system (which is under DOE control) to supply the facility. The use of this system for either safety significant or safety class applications raises concerns related to whether the municipality would be subject to DOE enforcement requirements that will need to be addressed. Finally, as discussed in Section 5.9, this arrangement also raises issues regarding where the safety class or safety significant boundary would be drawn. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, arguments have been made that municipal water supplies are extremely reliable, even more so than dedicated systems and should be allowed. If this is the case for a given site and facility, then it may be possible to provide a justification to utilize a municipal system, if all of the nuclear safety criteria can be met and the issues discussed above addressed.

#### Water Supply Arrangement No. 2: Multipurpose (domestic/industrial/fire) water supply system under DOE control.


In this detail, water is obtained from a fresh-water source, such as a well or river, treated and then stored on site by both suction and elevated water storage tanks.



Similar to Arrangement 1 above, this arrangement should not be utilized for safety class applications but is used for general purpose fire protection and may be used in safety significant applications if requirements for reliability and quality assurance are met. The reason that the system should not be used in safety class applications is that, even though the system is essentially passive and under DOE control, it is not under the facility's control. Because it is not under the facility's control, it is prudent to have an additional backup system which is under the facility's control. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.9, this arrangement raises issues regarding where the safety class or safety significant boundary would be drawn.

**Water Supply Arrangement No. 3: DOE Site supplied by a separate site-maintained fire water distribution network.**


In this detail, water is obtained from a fresh-water source, such as a well or river, treated and then stored on site by both suction and elevated water storage tanks. The fire water and domestic water systems are separate. The only interface is the feeding of the fire water suction tank from the domestic water system.



Similar to Arrangement 2 above, this arrangement should not be utilized for safety class applications but is used for general purpose fire protection and may be used safety significant applications if requirements for reliability and quality assurance are met. The reason that the system should not be used in safety class applications is that, even though the system is essentially passive and under DOE control, it is not under the facility's control. Because it is not under the facility's control, it is prudent to have an additional backup system which is under the facility's control.

#### **Water Supply Arrangement No. 4: DOE Protected Facility supplied by a dedicated fire water distribution network.**

In this detail, water is obtained from a fresh-water source, such as a well or river, treated and then stored on site by both suction and elevated water storage tanks. The fire protection suction tank is sized to provide adequate water supply without reliance of the fill for the design basis fire.




This arrangement could be utilized for safety significant applications if conditions specified in Section 5.3 of this guide are met. If the supplied system (e.g., wet pipe sprinkler) needs to operate in a seismic event (e.g., to mitigate a seismically induced fire), then the supply system must be qualified to the same level as the supplied system.

This arrangement may be appropriate for use in safety class applications with assurance that no active single failure could disable the system.

#### **Water Supply Arrangement No. 5 - Hazard-specific limited supply water system.**

Water system flow and capacity for property protection, program preservation, and life safety, etc. are specified by the Uniform Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1), Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials (NFPA 801), the Building Code, the Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems (NFPA 13) or other general industrial standards. These standards typically require from several hundred thousand to several million gallons of water. None of these specify the amount of water needed to adequately protect a safety class or safety significant special hazard which must be determined on a case-by-case basis and justified in the FHA or DSA, taking into account issues such as criticality and spread of contamination. Nuclear safety objectives can often be achieved with much lower quantities of water. For example, 500 gallons may be sufficient to meet the safety class objective to protect a special hazard in a given facility. Such a limited supply could be provided by a single, passive, self-contained pressure tank within the facility, qualified to seismic and other safety class criteria (such as redundancy of active components), thus significantly limiting the safety class boundary. An additional water supply per the above codes and standards would be required to meet other fire protection objectives, but that additional supply is not required to meet safety class or safety significant criteria.



## APPENDIX C

### Summary of Additional Water Supply Criteria and Guidance for Safety Class and Safety Significant Applications

DOE has established very stringent design requirements for fire protection systems utilized at all facilities (nuclear and non-nuclear). For fire protection systems utilized in safety significant and safety class applications in DOE nuclear facilities, additional requirements and criteria may need to be implemented to ensure very high levels of reliability with increased design margins and quality assurance.

The following provides a summary of the requirements, criteria and guidance for three levels of protections provided, i.e., general use (e.g., non-nuclear), safety significant, and safety class:

#### **General Use**

Local Building Codes

Facility Safety Order (DOE O 420.1B)

DOE-STD-1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria*

Additional Highly Protected Risk Criteria; e.g., as defined in FM Global (formerly Factory Mutual) Data Sheets

#### **Safety-Significant (Design)**

In addition to the criteria for general use, the following additional design requirements/guidance is applicable for water supply systems used in safety significant applications:

- A. Underground piping should be limited to cement lined ductile iron (Class 52 minimum), polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping (Dimension Ratio [DR] 14), and high density polyethylene piping (DR9). Additional limitations of material type may be imposed for seismic design.
- B. Where restraints are required, two separate means of joint restraint should be used (e.g., thrust blocks, mechanical, rodding).
- C. Ferrous piping should be provided with corrosion protection such as polyethylene wrap or cathodic protection per AWWA standards.
- D. A stable pipe bed such as backfilling around piping to a height of eighteen inches of sand bedding (from outside of piping) should be provided.
- E. Sectional and sprinkler/standpipe control valves should be limited to factory assembled post indicator valve assemblies (PIVAs).
- F. In-ground pipe identification systems should be provided (ribbon, trace wire, red mud etc.).

- H. Environmental conditions should be specified for sprinkler systems and if necessary support systems should be provided to mitigate the condition. Examples include:
- Natural hazards such as seismic events, tornado, high winds, flooding and lightning, temperature (e.g., below freezing), and humidity;
  - Facility hazards, such as internal flooding, explosions, fire, missile impacts, vehicle impacts, and corrosive environments; and
  - Wildland fire.
- J. To support appropriate implementation of the site or project QA program relative to fire protection systems, the following topics should be addressed (beyond what is specifically identified in DOE O 420.1B and referenced NFPA codes and standards).
- Document control (documents are stored properly to avoid damage, responsibility for completeness, maintenance and distribution are identified, etc.).
  - Records of qualification of fire protection staff and control of qualification records.
  - Procurement documentation and control of purchased items or services.
  - Identification and control of components (e.g., sprinkler heads) per requirement 8 of NQA-1-2008, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*.
  - Handling, shipping and storage requirements for components.
  - Control of nonconforming items to prevent inadvertent installation or use.
  - Commercial grade dedication of components based upon third party testing and production monitoring.
- K. The QA program should be audited in different phases (design, construction and operations) using DOE Order 413.3A.

**Safety-Class (Design)**

In addition to the criteria for general use and safety significant applications, the following additional design requirements/guidance is applicable for water supply systems used in safety class applications:

- A. Active features of a water supply system should be designed to preclude a single point failure for safety class sprinkler systems if the component failure results in the system's inability to perform its safety function.

**Safety Significant (Operability)**

Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limiting Conditions for Operation should be defined (including appropriate action statements to address situations when the system is inoperable). TSR Surveillance Requirements should be defined consistent with NFPA 25 Inspection Testing and Maintenance requirements, or other established requirements by equipment manufacturers and water purveyors.

**Safety Class (Operability)**

Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Limiting Conditions for Operation should be defined (including appropriate action statements to address situations when the system is inoperable). TSR Surveillance Requirements should be defined consistent with NFPA 25 Inspection Testing and Maintenance requirements, or other established requirements by equipment manufacturers and water purveyors.

# U. S. Department of Energy

## **Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2008-1**

### *Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems*



**Washington, DC 20585**

**June 2008**

## Executive Summary

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board or DNFSB) stated in Recommendation 2008-1, *Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems*, that there is a need for standards applicable to the design and operation of fire protection systems being relied upon as a primary means of protecting the public and workers from radiological hazards at the Department of Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities.

The basis for the DNFSB Recommendation was that DOE's fire protection guidance documents do not include specific design and operational criteria for fire protection systems designated as safety class or safety significant. The Board believes that this lack of guidance makes design of new facilities and the assessment of proposed enhancements to fire protection systems in existing facilities more difficult and time consuming.

The Department has established general design criteria for safety class and safety-significant systems in DOE Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, and guidance on application of these general design criteria for fire protection systems in DOE Guide 420.1-1, *Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety*; and DOE Guide 420.1-3, *Implementation Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with DOE O 420. 1B, Facility Safety*. However, the Department recognizes that further criteria and guidance on design and operational criteria for these systems would be beneficial.

The Department's plans for developing these criteria and guidance are to:

- Identify and evaluate current design and operational requirements for fire protection systems based upon DOE and industry practices.
- Develop additional specific design and operational criteria for fire protection systems, as appropriate.
- Incorporate the specific design and operational criteria and implementing guidance into the Department's planned revision to DOE Standard 1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria*.
- As necessary, modify DOE Guide 420.1-1, DOE Guide 420.1-3, and other affected DOE directives to ensure compatibility with the new criteria used and guidance for fire protection systems.

Since several high hazard DOE projects currently in the design phase are planning on using a sprinkler system for safety-significant or safety class applications, DOE will focus its attention on this area in the near term.

As suggested in Recommendation 2008-1, the Department anticipates that the guidance developed will leave room for engineering judgment and innovative approaches to meet the fundamental safety class and safety-significant design criteria as well as system performance criteria identified in the facility-specific safety analysis.

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## 1.0 BACKGROUND

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board or DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2008-1, *Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems*, on January 29, 2008, which identified “the need for standards applicable to design and operation of fire protection systems being relied upon as primary means of protecting the public and workers from radiological hazards at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) defense nuclear facilities.”

The Board stated in Recommendation 2008-1 that, “although we can support reliance on fire protection systems as primary safety measures, we are no longer comfortable with such widespread reliance in the continued absence of specific criteria for the design and operation of such systems.” The Board noted that “DOE’s fire protection guidance documents do not provide design and operational criteria for fire protection systems designated as safety class or safety-significant and that this lack of guidance makes design of new facilities more difficult and time-consuming and the assessment of proposed enhancements to fire protection systems in existing facilities also more difficult.”

DOE Directives (e.g., DOE Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*) require national standards be used for design of fire protection systems. For example, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 13, *Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems*, which provides detailed requirements for design, construction, quality assurance, component testing, acceptance testing, factory inspection of vendors and operation of sprinkler systems, is used by DOE facilities. Furthermore, DOE facilities use NFPA 25, *Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems*, which specifies detailed requirements for periodic inspections and tests as well as maintenance of sprinkler systems and support systems, such as water supplies. However, these standards do not identify characteristics of fire protection systems that are “safety class” or “safety significant” since these terms are unique to DOE. Furthermore, DOE directives do not identify the differences, if any, between systems meeting national standards and those that meet DOE needs for “safety class” and “safety-significant” applications.

For all of its safety class and safety-significant systems (fire protection, ventilation, process, etc.), DOE utilizes general design criteria that are specified in DOE Order 420.1B and supporting DOE Guide 420.1-1, *Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria*. In 2007, DOE provided new guidance for design and operation (e.g., inspection and testing) of safety class and safety-significant fire protection systems in DOE Guide 420.1-3, *Implementation Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with DOE O 420. 1B, Facility Safety*. This guidance is general in nature and does not prescribe design and operating requirements for specific fire protection system types.

DOE recognizes that specific design and operational criteria may be beneficial and accepted the Board's Recommendation on March 19, 2008, to develop such criteria and implementing guidance. However, as suggested in Recommendation 2008-1, the Department anticipates that the guidance developed will leave room for engineering judgment and innovative approaches to meet the fundamental safety class and safety-significant design criteria as well as system performance criteria identified in the facility-specific safety analysis.

## **2.0 UNDERLYING CAUSES**

When DOE developed its safety requirements for nuclear facilities, it did not establish detailed design and operational requirements for each specific system that could be utilized in a safety class or safety-significant application. Instead, DOE developed general criteria; e.g., criteria related to safety system redundancy or to quality assurance, and identified nationally recognized standards to support the systems' designs. DOE designs safety class and safety-significant systems on a case-by-case basis, utilizing the general criteria discussed above as well as the functionality and reliability requirements specified in the facility's safety basis.

Several new nuclear projects have chosen to utilize fire protection systems, such as sprinkler systems, as safety class or safety-significant systems. In that this may be the case for future projects, DOE will develop additional specific design and operational criteria for safety class and safety-significant fire protection systems in new facilities where warranted.

## **3.0 BASELINE PARAMETERS**

The baseline parameters that govern implementation of the DNFSB Recommendation 2008-1 are:

- The new criteria will apply to new defense nuclear Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 facilities, which use safety class and safety-significant fire protection systems as part of the facility safety design.
- The new criteria may also apply to situations where DOE decides to modify the safety basis for an existing defense nuclear Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 facility such that an existing fire protection system is reclassified to perform a safety class or safety-significant function.
- Newly developed specific design criteria will be consistent with the general design criteria for safety class and safety-significant systems in DOE O 420.1B (and its associated implementing guide DOE G 420.1-1) and will address design aspects, such as single-point failures, reliability including the need for redundancy in certain areas, e.g., water supplies, and seismic protection.

- Newly developed specific operational criteria will be consistent with DOE O 420.1B and DOE O 433.1A, *Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities*, as well as DOE G 423.1-1, *Implementation Guide For Use In Developing Technical Safety Requirements*. Operational aspects that impact system reliability (e.g., technical safety requirements, maintenance, and inspection and testing) will be addressed.
- New design and associated operational criteria will be developed only for the few types of fire protection systems anticipated to be used in safety class and safety-significant applications at multiple sites.
- The new design and associated operational criteria will allow for engineering judgment and flexibility.

#### **4.0 NEAR-TERM ACTIONS**

DOE Program and Field Elements have discussed the DNFSB recommendation and formed a team to develop this implementation plan. Since no current operational safety issues were identified in the recommendation, no immediate or near-term actions are needed to ensure safety at DOE facilities.

#### **5.0 ISSUE RESOLUTION**

This section is organized around the areas listed below. While the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) will have lead responsibility for most of the commitments described, as discussed in Section 6.0, it will work collaboratively with affected Program and Field Elements to work on the following:

- Identification of types of safety class and safety-significant fire protection systems in use and planned.
- Identification of the state of the practice for design of safety class and safety-significant systems in DOE facilities and for critical fire protection systems in other agencies' facilities and the private sector.
- Development of additional specific design and operational criteria for safety class and safety-significant fire protection systems, as necessary.
- Incorporation of changes to applicable DOE directives.

##### **5.1 Identify Fire Protection Systems Commonly Used (or Anticipated to be Used) in Safety Class and Safety-Significant Applications**

DOE will survey its Field Elements to identify fire protection systems utilized in safety class and safety-significant applications (for both existing and planned facilities). DOE

will utilize this information to identify those systems for which specific design and operational criteria are appropriate. DOE anticipates choosing two or more systems to develop specific design criteria for. Limiting the number of systems will allow appropriate resources to be applied for the timely development of criteria for the systems. Lessons learned from the development and application of these criteria may be applied to additional systems in the future. Since several high hazard DOE projects currently in the design phase are planning on using a sprinkler system for safety-significant or safety class applications, DOE will focus its attention on such systems in the near term. The survey will serve as useful information to determine whether criteria and guidance for other fire protection systems should be developed.

**Milestone 5.1.1: Survey Site Offices to identify fire protection systems.**

Lead Responsibility: Office of Environmental Management (EM), Office of Science (SC) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Product: A listing and description of fire protection systems utilized in safety class and safety-significant applications (for both existing and planned facilities) delivered to HSS.

Due Date: One month after Implementation Plan Core Team has been assigned (anticipate July 2008)

**5.2 Identification of State of the Practice**

DOE will review current practice within the Department related to the design of safety class and safety-significant systems (for both fire protection systems and other systems). In addition, DOE will identify industry codes and standards such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Factory Mutual Global, International Code Council, etc., applicable to fire protection sprinkler systems in critical (e.g. high hazard or high value) facilities/applications. The design and operational criteria from each of the sources will be analyzed as to how they relate to the general design criteria for safety class and safety-significant systems.

**Milestone 5.2.1: Review current design practices for DOE safety class and safety-significant systems and industrial design and operational criteria used for fire protection sprinkler systems in other critical applications.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Product: Report on current design practices for DOE safety class and safety-significant systems and government and industrial design and operational criteria used for sprinkler systems in other critical applications.

Due Date: July 2008

### **5.3 Develop Additional Specific Design and Operational Criteria for Sprinkler Systems**

Based upon work done under Section 5.2, develop specific design and operational criteria for fire protection sprinkler systems. Interim guidance will be provided to support new facility design activities for sprinkler systems that will be issued by the Program Secretarial Offices to support current projects that are or will be designing safety class or safety-significant fire protection systems.

#### **Milestone 5.3.1: Draft Design and Operational Criteria for Sprinkler Systems.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Product: Draft design and operational criteria for fire protection sprinkler systems used in safety class and safety-significant applications.

Due Date: Three months after completion of Milestone 5.2.1 (anticipate October 2008)

#### **Milestone 5.3.2: Issue Interim Guidance on Design and Operational Criteria for Sprinkler Systems.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS, NNSA, and EM

Deliverable: Interim Guidance issued by Program Secretarial Offices to Field Organizations with current projects which utilize safety class or safety-significant fire protection systems.

Due Date: Two months after completion of Milestone 5.3.1 (anticipate December 2008).

### **5.4 Develop Specific Design and Operational Criteria for Additional Fire Protection Systems**

Based upon work done under Sections 5.1 and 5.2, develop specific design and operational criteria for other selected fire protection systems as appropriate.

#### **Milestone 5.4.1: Identify the types of fire protection systems (in addition to sprinkler systems) for which DOE will establish specific design and operating criteria.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: A list of the types of fire protection systems (beyond the sprinkler systems) for which specific design and operating criteria will be developed.

Due Date: November 2008

**Milestone 5.4.2: Draft Design and Operational Criteria for Selected Fire Protection Systems.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Draft design and operational criteria for fire protection systems (other than sprinkler systems) in safety class and safety-significant applications.

Due Date: Three months after completion of Milestone 5.4.1 (anticipate February 2009)

**5.5 Revise DOE Standard 1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria***

Based upon work done under Sections 5.3 and 5.4, incorporate specific design and operational criteria for sprinkler and other selected fire protection systems as appropriate.

**Milestone 5.5.1: Revise DOE Standard 1066 to include new design and operational criteria.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Draft revision of DOE Standard 1066 (submitted into RevCom).

Due Date: Two months after completion of Milestone 5.4.2 (anticipate April 2009).

**Milestone 5.5.2: Revised DOE Standard 1066 finalized and issued.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Issuance of DOE Standard 1066.

Due Date: Nine months after submittal to RevCom (anticipate January 2010).

## **5.6 Incorporate changes to applicable DOE directives**

### **Milestone 5.6.1: Draft changes to other impacted DOE directives (e.g., DOE G 420.1-1 and G 420.1-3).**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Draft revision of impacted DOE Directives (submitted into RevCom).

Due Date: Two months after completion of Milestone 5.4.2 (anticipate April 2009).

### **Milestone 5.6.2: Revised directives finalized and issued.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Issuance of affected DOE Directives.

Due Date: Nine months after submittal to RevCom (anticipate January 2010).

## **6.0 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT**

Overall execution of this IP is the responsibility of the Director of the Office of Nuclear Safety, Quality Assurance, and Environment. An Implementation Plan Core Team of staff and managers assigned by EM, NNSA, SC, and HSS will be established to develop the technical products committed to in the plan. The IP Core Team will be led by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance.

### **6.1 Roles and Responsibilities**

The 2008-1 Implementation Plan Core Team has the following responsibilities:

- Coordinate overall implementation of the Department's 2008-1 implementation plan.
- Complete designated milestones, working with affected organizations and obtaining necessary concurrences from affected program offices.
- Monitor plan milestones and provide assistance and feedback to keep plan milestones on schedule and consistent with the planned objectives.
- Review all 2008-1 Implementation Plan deliverables for completeness and consistency, and provide input and recommendations to the IP Core Team lead.

- Communicate regularly with affected Program and Field Elements regarding the status of plan activities and expectations for near-term activities in support of plan implementation.
- Keep DOE's executive leadership informed of overall plan performance and any issues that need senior management attention and direction.

## **6.2 Change Control**

Complex, long-range plans require sufficient flexibility to accommodate changes in commitments, actions, or completion dates that may be necessary due to additional information, improvements, or changes in baseline assumptions. The Department's policy is to: (1) provide prior written notification to the Board on the status of any IP milestone that will not be completed by the planned milestone date; (2) have Secretarial approval of all revisions to the scope and schedule of IP milestones; and (3) clearly identify and describe the revisions and bases for the revisions. Fundamental changes to the IP's strategy, scope, or schedule will be provided to the Board through formal revision and re-issuance of the IP. Other changes to the scope or schedule of planned milestones will be formally provided in appropriate correspondence approved by the Secretary, along with the basis for the changes and appropriate corrective actions.

## **6.3 Reporting**

To ensure the various Department implementing elements and the Board remain informed of the status of plan implementation, the Department plans to provide progress reports to the Board and/or Board staff approximately every six months.

**Commitment 1: The Department will provide briefings to the Board and Board Staff. These briefings will include updates on the status of completing actions identified in the various reviews indicated in this IP.**

Lead Responsibility: HSS

Deliverable: Briefings

Due Date: September 2008 and approximately every six months thereafter until the final deliverable.

**Table – Summary of Deliverables**

No.	Milestones/Commitment	Deliverable	Anticipated Delivery Date
5.3.2	Issue Interim Guidance on Design and Operational Criteria for Sprinkler Systems.	Interim guidance	December 2008
5.4.1	Identify types of fire protection systems (in addition to sprinkler systems) for which DOE will establish specific design and operating criteria.	List of types of fire protection systems	November 2008
5.4.2	Draft Design and Operational Criteria for Selected Fire Protection Systems.	Draft Criteria	February 2009
5.5.1	Revise DOE-STD-1066 to include new design and operational criteria.	Draft Standard	April 2009
5.5.2	Revise DOE-STD-1066 finalized and issued.	Final Standard	January 2010
5.6.1	Draft changes to other impacted DOE directives.	Draft revision to DOE Directives	April 2009
5.6.2	Revise directives finalized and issued.	Final Directives	January 2010
6.3.1	Commitment – DOE will provide Board briefings.	Briefings – Semiannually	Starting September 2008